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Recent Developments

Tuer v. McDonald:

I

n Tuer v. McDonald, 347 Md.
507, 701 A.2d 1101 (1997), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a change in medical protocol
was inadmissible under Maryland
Rule 5-407 as evidence of a
subsequent remedial measure.
Specifically, the court denied the
plaintiffs contentions that defense
testimony challenged the feasibility
of the new protocol or placed the
testimony
at
issue
for
impeachment purposes. The court
ruled that the testimony was the
product of a judgment call on the
advisability of the new practice. In
so holding, the court narrowed the
impeachment
exception
and
strictly limited the feasibility
exception
in
the
medical
malpractice context.
Eugene Tuer ("Tuer") was
admitted to St. Joseph's Hospital
on October 30, 1992, after
complaining of chest pains. Tuer
was scheduled to have coronary
artery bypass graft ("CABG")
surgery on November 2, 1992 at
9:00 a.m. Drs. McDonald and
Brawley ("Defendants") were the
scheduled surgeons for Tuer's
operation. After further complaints
of chest pain, Tuer's cardiologist
prescribed Heparin, an anticoagulant, to stabilize his heart
In accordance with
condition.
hospital protocol, Tuer stopped
receiving Heparin at 5:30 a.m. on
the morning of the surgery.
During trial, Dr. McDonald
testified that the purpose of
discontinuing Heparin three to four
hours before surgery was to allow
the blood to coagulate.
He
explained that during the first stage
of CABG surgery, the jugular vein
is punctured and there is an
inherent 5-10% risk of an
inadvertent puncture of the carotid
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artery. Dr. McDonald stated that it
was critical for patients not to have
Heparin in their blood prior to
surgery because a puncture of the
carotid artery could cause a
serious bleeding problem.
The surgeons delayed Tuer's
surgery to attend to another patient
in critical condition. They decided
not to provide Heparin to Tuer
during the period of delay. Tuer
went into cardiac arrest at 1:00
p.m. After seven hours of surgery
and other resuscitation efforts,
Tuer died. Following his death, the
defendants
changed
their
procedure
for
discontinuing
Heparin for patients with unstable
angina, Tuer's condition. Under
the new protocol, patients receive
Heparin until they go into surgery.
At trial in the Circuit Court of
Maryland for Baltimore County,
the
Mary Tuer ("Plaintiff'),
surviving spouse of Tuer, made
two efforts to introduce the
defendants change in protocol into
evidence through the adverse
Dr.
witness
testimony
of
McDonald. First, she sought to
use the new protocol to prove the
feasibility of her husband surviving
CABG surgery with Heparin in his
blood.
Defense counsel's
objection to this line of questioning

was sustained by the court, but Dr.
McDonald stated that he believed
it would have been unsafe to
restart the Heparin during the
delay. Plaintiff then attempted to
use the new protocol to impeach
Dr. McDonald's statement. The
court rejected the plaintiffs
impeachment
argument
and
entered
judgment
for
the
defendants. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
trial court's decision. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to review the trial court's
exclusion of the evidence.
The court of appeals began its
analysis
by
examining
the
development of Maryland law on
the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures before the
adoption of Maryland Rule 5-407.
Tuer, 347 Md. at 516,701 A.2d at
1105.
Giving the common law
reasoning behind the exclusion of
later adopted measures, the court
stated that introduction of latter
taken measures places an unjust
interpretation on the defendant's
actions and offers an incentive for
continued negligence. Id. at 517,
701 A.2d at 11 06 (citing Columbia
v. Hawthome, 144 U.S. 202
Under Columbia,
(1892».
evidence of a subsequent remedial
measure was excluded as an
admission of liability or proof of
negligence. Id. at 518-21, 701
A.2d at 1106-08. Maryland courts
followed the Supreme Court rule
laid out in Columbia, but an
exception to the exclusionary rule
developed. Id. at 518,701 A.2d at
1106.
The court noted that evidence
became admissible to show that
the defendants departed from the
proper standard of care. Id. at
520, 701 A.2d at 1107 (citing
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Blanco v. J.e. Penny, 251 Md.
707, 248 A.2d 645 (1968». In
Blanco, the plaintiff introduced
evidence of the defendant placing
decals on plate glass panels after
the plaintiff sustained an injury by
walking into the glass panel. Id.
The evidence was admitted, not as
an admission of negligence, but to
show a deviation from the proper
standard of care due at the time of
the injury. Id.
Turning to an analysis of the
drafting of Maryland Rule 5-407,
the court offered the text of the
Maryland statute and stated that
the
Rules
Committee
recommended the adoption of the
substance and interpretation of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 407. Id.
at 521, 701 A.2d. at 1108. In
endorsing the new rule, the
Committee made it clear that the
standard of care exception was not
part of the rule. Id. at 522, 701
A.2d at 1108.
The two
justifications for excluding the
exception were: 1) that subsequent
changes are equally compatible
with an accidental injury or
contributory negligence; and 2) the
public policy of encouraging
individuals to add safety measures
whenever possible.
Id. (citing
Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183,225-226 (1973». The
Maryland
Rules
Committee
believed the standard of care
exception
would
essentially
become the rule and did not add it
to the list of exceptions. Id at 522,
701 A.2d at 1108.
Next, the court reviewed
Plaintiffs arguments for admission
of the change in protocol into
evidence. Id. at 524,701 A.2d at
1109. Plaintiffs first contention
was that Dr. McDonald's testimony
challenged the feasibility of the
new protocol. Id. at 524, 701 A.2d
at 1109. Maryland Rule 5-407(b)
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permits evidence of a subsequent
remedial measure when it is
introduced to prove the feasibility
of the change, but only if the
defendant disputes the feasibility.
Id. A problem arises when the
defendant offers an explanation for
not making a change earlier and
the plaintiff asserts that the
explanation is tantamount to a
feasibility challenge. Id. at 527,
701 A.2d at 1111. The court noted
that the issue was whether Dr.
McDonald's
judgment
call
controverted the feasibility of the
change in protocol. Id. at 528,
701 A.2d at 1111.
Under normal circumstances,
Dr. McDonald's statement that he
believed restarting the Heparin
would be unsafe, would ordinarily
suffice as a challenge to the
feasibility of the measure. Id.
However, the court determined
that in a medical context the
standard is different. Id. The
court characterized Dr. McDonald's
testimony as the product of a
balancing test between that which
was medically possible and that
which was advisable under the
current circumstances. Id. at 529,
701 A.2d at 1112. Observing that
"virtually anything can physically be
done to the human body," the court
determined that Dr. McDonald was
merely stating that which was
medically not advisable, but still
feasible. Id. at 528-29, 701 A.2d
at 1111-1112.
Next, the court addressed
Plaintiffs effort to fit the change in
protocol into the impeachment
exception under Maryland Rule 5407(b). Id. at 529, 701 A.2d at
1112. The prevailing view is that
the impeachment exception must
be read narrowly. Id. Proposing
examples of simple defendant
statements that could logically be
impeached with a subsequent
measure, the court asserted that

subsequent remedial measure
evidence is usually not permitted
to show a minor discrepancy in the
defendant's testimony. Id. at 530,
701 A.2d 1112.
Although a
contradiction can always be
illustrated, the issue is the nature
of the contradiction. Id. While
rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the
court reasoned that the hospital's
change in protocol after Tuer's
death does not suggest that the
defendant's believed they acted
inappropriately. Id. at 532, 701
A.2d at 1113.
The. court
concluded by stressing that the
kind of reevaluation that occurred
in this case was precisely the
process that Maryland Rule 5-407
was designed to promote and
protect. Id.
In Tuer, the court of appeals
held that a doctor's testimony,
regarding the imprudence of the
use of a different medical
procedure, was not a challenge to
the feasibility of that procedure.
Additionally, the court ruled that
the doctor's testimony regarding
the dangers inherent in the new
procedure did not open the door to
impeach the testimony. These
rulings prevented the plaintiff from
introducing the change in protocol
as an exception to the general bar
against admission of subsequent
remedial measures. The court's
holding created a safe haven for
in
medical
professionals
malpractice cases. Under Tuer,
medical professionals can admit
the alternate procedure was
feasible, but, in their opinion not
advisable. Standing on the new
middle
ground,
medical
malpractice defendants will be
afforded the protection of Maryland
Rule 5-407(a). Under Tuer, the
testimony will be deemed a
judgment call, not a challenge to
feasibility.

